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A net assessment of the beneﬁts/losses of arms control treaties in terms of military
signiﬁcance was required in response to the START Resolution of Ratiﬁcation. The
response by the Executive Branch belabored smaller issues, avoided accomplishments
and didn’t carry out the net assessment.

The Cold War seems like a distant memory. However, issues remain that should
be studied if we do not wish to relive history. How much did arms control keep
the peace between the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union? Did the arms control process
pave the way to end the Cold War peacefully? Did the Soviet Union comply with
arms control treaties? Was the U.S. compliance process a meaningful, truthful
exercise? Were the Soviet violations militarily signiﬁcant? What was the net
assessment in terms of military signiﬁcance between violations on arms control
treaties and arms reductions pursuant to arms control treaties? Was the “ef
fective veriﬁcation” standard sufﬁcient to protect the U.S. national security?1
These are large questions, which we will only partially answer. The frame
work for this article was established during 1990–1992 when Bill Ashworth
and I were the two majority professional staff members at the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee (SFRC), which were appointed to examine arms control
treaties at the end of the Cold War.2
In a previous occasional report to Science & Global Security, I examined
the robustness of the U.S. triad and the ability of Soviet defenses to oppose
the triad.3 The primary reference was an eight-volume, classiﬁed study by
the Government Accounting Ofﬁce, widely thought to be the best such study,
and the follow-up unclassiﬁed Senate hearings.4 In this occasional report, we

examine the issue framed by the SFRC in its Condition Seven of the START
I Resolution of Ratiﬁcation. Condition Seven required the President to carry
out a net assessment analysis on the good and bad impacts of arms control
treaties. Losses from arms control treaties come from noncompliance to the
arms control treaties. The beneﬁts of arms control treaties come from the re
duction of nuclear weapons, the removal of destabilizing weapons or tactics,
and the establishment of cooperative measures to increase stability between
the superpowers. Condition Seven requires the assessment be carried out in
terms of military signiﬁcance, namely the threat to U.S. nuclear forces.
The efﬁcacy of arms control treaties was hotly debated before the SFRC. One
side believed that arms control gave a predictable future that would avoid irra
tional actions. The other side, championed by the Ranking Minority Member,
Senator Jesse Helms, believed that Soviets would massively cheat to threaten
U.S. national security. The SFRC national security staff was convinced that the
importance of this issue warranted a serious analysis by the executive branch
at the end of the Cold War. With this in mind, it was decided that a condition
requiring a presidential report was needed to shed light on the issue.

MODUS OPPORENDI
Section I below displays Condition Seven and the SFRC report language that
supported it. This is followed in Section II with a description of the Report to
the Congress on Treaty Compliance. Because of space limitations we examine
only the analysis of the INF treaty, and not the SALT agreements because they
are too old, and not the START treaty because it had not entered into force at
the time of the March 1993 presidential report. Section III is our conclusion on
the adequacy of the presidential response.

I.A. SENATE CONDITION SEVEN ON TREATY COMPLIANCE5
Within 180 days of the Senate’s giving its advice and consent to ratiﬁcation of
the treaty, the President shall submit to the Senate an updated and expanded
compliance report in classiﬁed and unclassiﬁed form, setting forth—
(A) a listing and discussion of the actions which are violations or probable
violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II,
ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues;
(B) a listing and discussion of the actions which are in compliance with the
SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties; and
(C) a comparison of the military signiﬁcance of those actions listed in subpara
graphs (A) and (B).

I.B. SENATE REPORT ON CONDITION SEVEN6
The degree of Soviet noncompliance has been widely debated over the years.
Condition Seven of the Resolution of Ratiﬁcation requires a compliance report
on all the major acts of compliance and noncompliance by the former Soviet
Union and its successor states. Our future relations with the successor states
on arms control treaties will, of course, continue to be addressed in the report
called for in Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.
Condition Seven calls for expanded and updated compliance report that
could well be the last such noncompliance report on the disbanded Soviet Union.
This report calls for listing of all signiﬁcant Soviet and successor states viola
tions and probable violations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM,
INF and START treaties. This listing shall be accompanied with a discussion
of the ultimate resolution of these issues. Second, Condition Seven requires a
listing of the signiﬁcant acts of compliance to these arms control treaties by the
former Soviet Union, and the successor states. This list shall contain the num
bers and types of systems eliminated, such as silos, missiles, and launchers. In
addition, this report shall list the aggregate numbers of inspections and noti
ﬁcations that were carried out without any problems, as well as any for which
there were difﬁculties. Lastly the report calls for a comparison of the military
signiﬁcance of the acts in noncompliance as compared to the acts of compliance.
In the committee’s view, the arms control process with the Soviets and their
successors, on balance, has paved the way towards the reductions in the START
Treaty and the deeper reductions in the prospective de-MIRVing Treaty. The
report required in Condition Seven serves as a useful adjunct when considering
the net beneﬁt of arms control agreements with the former Soviets.
The committee therefore recommends a condition requiring the submission
of a Presidential Report on Treaty Compliance and the Military Signiﬁcance of
Treaty Violations within 180 days of the Senate’s giving its advice and consent
to the ratiﬁcation of the START Treaty. This updated and expanded compliance
report will differ from annual Pell report (Section 52 of the ACDA Act) by listing
all the actions of compliance and all the actions of past violation, or probable
past violation, and then comparing the military signiﬁcance of these two kinds
of actions.

II. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT OF MARCH 1993
The Presidential Report consisted of one page of introduction, 11 pages on vi
olations, 2.3 pages on acts of compliance, and 1.3 pages on a net assessment.
The most clear-cut violations listed were as follows: The Krasnoyarsk radar
(which was to be converted into a furniture factory) was a clear-cut violation to
the ABM Treaty, but it was not militarily signiﬁcant in a capacity to help shoot
down U.S. ICBMs. The second “new type missile” (the SS-25) was a violation

to the START II Agreement. Condition Seven did not address nuclear testing,
but if it had, it should have discussed the history of the “likely violation” of
the Threshold Test Ban Treat (TTBT). This charge was removed in 1990 after
the 1988 CORRTEX measurements at Semipalatinsk Test Site and after prop
erly taking into account the geological differences between test sites.7 The U.S.
record on TTBT noncompliance charges was not entirely honorable.

II.A. VIOLATIONS TO THE INF TREATY (EXCERPTS FROM THE
PRESIDENTIAL REPORT)
1. Transits of Missiles on Launchers. The intermediate-range missiles may be
carried on their launchers only at repair or elimination facilities and not
so carried for transit to other locations. The Soviets had notiﬁed the U.S.
of nearly 200 such transits to fulﬁll the terms of the INF treaty. After dis
cussions in the Special Veriﬁcation Commission, the Soviets changed their
transit practices.
2. Non-declared Treaty-Limited Items. In the summer of 1988 the Soviets had
some errors in their data in the Memorandum of Understanding, which they
corrected.
3. Un-notiﬁed Movements of Training Launchers. There was a disagreement
on whether notiﬁcation was necessary for moving training launchers. The
Soviets later agreed to do this.
4. Missiles at an Elimination Facility. Two SS-12 missiles that should have
been removed were discovered at the Saryozek Main Operating Base.
5. Missiles at Non-declared Locations. For brief times, some SS-20 missiles
and launchers were parked outside of two launch-to-destruction elimination
sites. The boundaries of the two sites were redrawn since these were parked
at these locations as a temporary convenience.
6. Cargoscan. For 10 days in March 1990 the Soviets refused to allow Cargoscan
to x-ray image missiles the Votkinsk missile factory exit portal. The Soviets
had objections to U.S. procedures, which were then modiﬁed for Soviet
acceptance.

II.B. PROBABLE VIOLATION TO THE INF TREATY
SS-23 Missiles: Article I of the INF Treaty provides that each party shall elimi
nate all “its” intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and not have such
systems thereafter. Article V repeats the requirement that each Party eliminate
all “its” shorter-range missiles of the categories “listed in the Memorandum
of Understanding . . . ” Article VI contains a prohibition against producing or

ﬂight-testing any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. Read together,
these provisions in effect also contain a prohibition on transfer of treaty-limited
items after Treaty signature: each Party must destroy all of its intermediaterange and shorter-range missiles and may not produce any such missiles in the
future for any purpose, including transfer.
In early 1990, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) publicly stated
that it was eliminating SS-23 missiles located there, the United States became
aware for the ﬁrst time of the existence of SS-23 missiles in three Eastern
European countries. The Soviet Union stated they transferred SS-23s to the
GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, prior to entry into force of the INF Treaty.
None of these three countries is a party to the INF Treaty. SS-23 missiles are
shorter-range missiles that are listed in the INF Treaty. Soviet SS-23 missiles
were to have been eliminated by November 1, 1989.
The issue of whether the existence of these SS-23 missiles violated the INF
Treaty was ﬁrst examined and reported in the February 1991 President’s Non
compliance Report. In September 1991, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma
ment Agency submitted a Supplemental Report to Congress on SS-23 Missiles
in Eastern Europe. That Supplemental Report stated the ﬁnding that the Soviet
Union:
had understandings that constituted what amounted to an undisclosed pro
gram of cooperation. Thus, the United States has reafﬁrmed its previous ﬁnding
that the Soviet Union negotiated in bad faith. The United States further found
that the Soviet Union has probably violated the Elimination Protocol of the Treaty
by failing to eliminate in accordance with Treaty procedures, re-entry vehicles as
sociated with and released from programs of cooperation.

II.C. ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY TO THE INF TREATY
The Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI)
and facilities under strict veriﬁcation by the United States. Since the last re
port, the Soviet Union and new states of the former Soviet Union continued
to allow the United States to exercise its inspection rights contained in the
INF Treaty. These inspections included the presence of the United States’ con
tinuous monitoring inspection site at Votkinsk, Russian Federation; and the
conduct of on-site inspections by the United States.

II.D. NET ASSESSMENT ON THE INF TREATY
Prior to the signing of the INF Treaty, serious concerns existed within the
United States and among our allies concerning the threat posed by Soviet INF
systems—particularly the mobile SS-20 missile. Under the INF Treaty, the
Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and

facilities under strict veriﬁcation by the United States. The United States is
concerned over the continued existence of the SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe
and continues to pursue their destruction in order to fulﬁll the objective of
the INF Treaty to eliminate this class of missiles. On balance, however, the
achievements of the INF Treaty have strengthened western security.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL REPORT
The Presidential Report on noncompliance is made up of poor scholarship
and errors of omission. The length of Presidential Report was divided as fol
lows: violations (4 pages), compliant acts (0.2 pages), net assessment analysis
(0.2 pages). Thus, violations got twenty times the space, compared to compliant
acts and compared to the net assessment analysis. This is particularly shame
ful because greater analysis already existed in the published SFRC Report on
the START Treaty, which is given below.

III.A. VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY
SS-23 Issue in SFRC START Report8
The issue of undeclared the Soviet-manufactured SS–23s located in Eastern
Europe has been addressed in a separate report (September 19, 1991) to the
Congress. The Soviets had not declared the 72 SS-23 missiles involved in the
programs of cooperation with the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately, the U.S. had not asked about these kinds of
programs during the negotiation of the INF Treaty, partly because the U.S. did
not wish to discuss the situation of the Pershing-I missiles that were owned (and
later destroyed) by the Federal Republic of Germany. The Pershing-I systems
were under the joint control of the FRG and the U.S.
In a response to a question by Senator Pressler on the ultimate disposition
of the SS-23s, the Administration stated:
German, Czech and Slovak federal governments have indicated that the mis
siles in their possession would be destroyed when technical and environmental
matters were resolved. Bulgaria, however has made conﬂicting statements on
whether it will destroy its missiles. While continuing to press for destruction of
the SS-23s, it is not in our interests to the delay reaping the beneﬁts of START
pending SS-23 destruction.

CONCLUSION ON INF VIOLATIONS
The six violations to the INF Treaty listed in the Presidential Report were not
militarily signiﬁcant. The issues raised were mostly a matter of sloppiness on

the Soviet side and some disagreement as to procedures. The INF Treaty was
very complicated to administer. This was particularly difﬁcult for the decaying
Soviet Union in 1988 to 1991. Because of these procedural problems on the INF
Treaty, the START Treaty gave more certainty by growing to 280 pages, plus
considerable auxiliary documents. The issue of the probable violation of SS-23
missiles was discussed in more detail in the SFRC START Report, which was
available to the Executive Branch, than in the Presidential report. The SS-23
issue is confusing because the U.S. had a similar situation at the time of the
negotiation, namely weapon systems shared with its ally Germany.

III.B. ACTS OF COMPLIANCE TO THE INF TREATY
INF Compliance Data in START Report, but Neglected
in the Presidential Report9
As of May 31, 1991, the Soviet Union eliminated all of its declared inter
mediate range missiles and launchers, and all of its declared shorter-range
missiles and launchers. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the Soviets eliminated
1,846 missiles with the capability to carry 3,154 warheads, and it destroyed
825 launchers.
5 SS-5 missiles;
654 SS-20 missiles (3 warheads each);
509 SS-20 lauchers;
149 SS-4 missiles;
72 SS-4 launchers;
718 SS-12 missiles;
132 SS-12 launchers;
239 SS-23 missiles;
106 SS-23 launchers;
80 SSC-X-4 missiles;
6 SSC-X-4 launchers.

CONCLUSION ON INF COMPLIANT ACTS
The Presidential Report states only that the “Soviet Union eliminated all its
declared INF Treaty limited items and facilities under strict veriﬁcation by the
United States.” This meager answer does not give the readily available data

listed above from the SFRC report. In addition, the Presidential Report did not
give the required information on inspections.

III.C. NET ASSESSMENT ON THE INF TREATY
Senate Report Language entitled the required report as the Presidential Report
on Treaty Compliance and the Military Signiﬁcance of Treaty Violations. As an
indictor of what the report became, the executive branch removed the Presi
dential authorship and reduced the scope by deleting Military Signiﬁcance of
Treaty Violations. The ﬁnal report was merely named the Report to Congress
on Treaty Compliance. The 0.2 pages of net beneﬁt analysis in the Presiden
tial Report primarily discuss the SS-23 situation. By 1993, the Soviets had lost
control of its allies for four years, as the Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989.
The Presidential Report addressed the net assessment issue with but one
sentence, “On balance, however, the achievements of the INF Treaty have
strengthened western security.” This cursory answer does not tell the Congress
the military signiﬁcance of the Soviet Union eliminating all of its declared in
termediate range missiles and launchers, and all of its declared shorter-range
missiles and launchers. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the Soviets eliminated
1,846 missiles with the capability to carry 3,154 warheads, and it destroyed
825 launchers. The cursory answer does not give the military signiﬁcance of
the six INF violations and the one probable violation.
The Presidential Report should have informed us that the number of Soviet
removed warheads (3,154) is over three times the number of U.S. removed war
heads (856). In addition, the Presidential Report should have given estimates of
the effectiveness of these warheads on allied targets. Such a quantitative anal
ysis was carried out on page 52 of the Senate Report on START, which used an
exchange model to determine survivable forces, with and without violations.
There is a strange lesson to be learned here. It should be clear to most
readers that the INF Treaty was necessary to end the Cold War peacefully.
Without the INF Treaty, it is unlikely that the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty would have allowed reductions in conventional arms. Without
CFE, there would not have been START, thus making the ending of the Cold
War more difﬁcult. The authors of the Presidential Report did not want to make
these kinds of positive statements on arms control, nor did they give the speciﬁc
accomplishments of arms control. This is an important lesson for historians and
future leaders.
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